The Stronger Model Has Half the Users—The Underrated Power of Persona
A 78-year-old grandmother chatted with Doubao for hours, revisiting childhood memories. Afterward she said it was the first time in her life she felt truly seen and heard. Her own children had never managed that. An AI did.
But the enterprise market runs on a different logic entirely. Executives pay for delivery efficiency and certainty—nobody signs a contract because the mascot is cute. AI office penetration sits below 5% today and is expected to reach 80%. The real contest is who captures the people trying AI at work for the very first time.
380 million versus 160 million—more than double. Those are the monthly active user counts for Doubao and Qwen. Both are free AI assistants. Qwen leads on most composite benchmarks. So where does the gap come from? Not spending, not channel muscle. There is a variable that has been seriously underestimated: persona. Zhang Pinpin defines it as the relationship a product establishes with its user.
Open Doubao and a short-haired cartoon girl greets you. The product is trying to be your close friend. Qwen’s tagline is “can chat, can work”—pure tool logic. When the relationship is different, user expectations and behavior diverge completely. Inside Doubao’s scenario, people feel like they are talking to a person. They invest more time, say more words, and even when the answer is not perfectly accurate they do not mind much. They joke around, and those jokes become shareable moments that spread the product further.
A real story illustrates this. A 78-year-old grandmother chatted with Doubao for hours, walking through memories from her childhood. When she finished, she said it was the first time in her life she felt truly seen and heard. What her own children had never managed, an AI did.
Two years ago, Zhang Pinpin’s team was building a medical-service scenario with an AI health manager. They spent enormous effort making the AI “talk like a human.” One client had been using the service for a long time and had been clearly told the group chat was staffed by both a real doctor and an AI working together. He never believed it. He kept assuming the AI health manager was a real doctor and kept thanking that real doctor. In communication that carries persona, users unconsciously supply richer context, and the AI’s responses become more accurate as a result.
Qwen works on entirely different logic. Open it and the feeling is an extension of a search engine. Faced with a cold interface, users stop talking like humans. They punch in a few keywords, drop a couple of tags—sometimes not even a complete sentence—and tell the AI to get to work. Under those conditions, good output is almost impossible. Tencent’s Yuanbao shares the same problem. Its call volume is already very large, driven mostly by WeChat search and Video Account comment summaries, but the scenarios are narrow. Without meaningful user feedback and behavioral data, there is no path to higher-quality training data.
Alibaba has struggled with the marketing side of this for a while. Back in June last year, Zhang Pinpin called out Alibaba’s AQ health assistant on his social feed. He will not spell out the image the name “AQ” conjures in the public mind, but the practical issue was just as bad: regional dialects in many parts of China cannot produce the “Q” sound, turning the name into “Aqiu” or “Qiuqiu.” Alibaba ran massive nationwide ad campaigns for more than six months. Then it renamed the product “Afu.” The day after the rename it shot to number three on the Apple App Store overall chart. How much money was burned before that single change?
The takeaway on the consumer side is blunt: winning or losing sometimes has nothing to do with product or model capability. What decides whether users stay is the scene and the atmosphere you create.
The enterprise market, however, runs on a completely different set of rules. The big news this week is that Coze has been folded entirely into Doubao, Doubao Work has officially launched its AI office Agent, and it now connects with Feishu. That means ByteDance’s AI is moving into the enterprise space. But companies pay for delivery efficiency and certainty—no executive signs a contract because the mascot is cute.
Three players are fighting right now: Qwen Office paired with DingTalk, WorkBuddy paired with WeCom, and Doubao Work paired with Feishu. Their challenges could not be more different.
DingTalk claims 200 million monthly actives, which sounds intimidating. Break it open, though, and over 70% are small businesses in manufacturing and wholesale-retail. A wholesale-retail owner who barely opens a computer is not about to adopt AI for office work. The pool of enterprise users on DingTalk who can realistically migrate to AI office tools is not that large.
WeCom has around 15 million users. Its primary purpose is connecting businesses to consumers on WeChat, skewing heavily toward consumer goods, food service, and services. The dominant need is managing thousands of customer relationships in private traffic. WorkBuddy can plug into WeCom. Tencent also has an internal product called Dayuan in beta, focused on internal and external communication management and operational management. Compared with Dayuan, WorkBuddy is a more open and more ambitious platform—closer to Tencent’s core strategy of “connecting everything.”
Feishu has been surging in recent years. Its user base is one-seventh of DingTalk’s, yet the revenue generated by its paying users is nearly on par. Software companies, internet firms, tech enterprises, banks, new-energy automakers, MCN agencies, and independent creators make up Feishu’s core base. Nine out of ten AI bloggers are teaching their audiences how to integrate with Feishu. The organic, user-driven spread is enormous.
WorkBuddy and Doubao Work have a tough fight ahead, but the fight is not over existing users. AI office penetration sits below 5% today and is projected to reach 80%. The real battleground is who captures more people trying AI at work for the very first time and builds the dependency and habits that stick. This is a ground war, face to face. Both sides are buying traffic aggressively—CPM drops below 26 or 27 and they buy without limit. Channel buildout is essentially running on autopilot. Under those conditions, communication efficiency matters enormously. WorkBuddy may genuinely need a name change; a name that is hard to spread will cost them dearly.
The fight for users among AI applications in this era is destined to be a prolonged brawl. Early-stage customers have zero loyalty. Whichever product works better and costs less gets the business, and data migration with AI assistance is already very cheap. How the war ends, we can only wait and see. But one thing is already certain: while the battle rages, the channel partners and the salespeople will be making money hand over fist.
Source: EP0086 (2026-08-26, 5:25) · audio recorded by the host · on-screen presenter is an AI avatar · both text and timecodes come from gemini-2.5-pro ASR of that recording, with four passages re-checked by ear
[00:00] 380 million and 160 million—a difference of more than double This is Doubao’s and Qwen’s monthly active user data Has anyone ever thought about this question They’re both free AI large models Qwen’s overall model capability leads on all sorts of benchmarks So why is Doubao’s user volume so much larger than Qwen’s Is it because they spent more money or because their distribution is stronger I think there’s a variable here that’s been seriously underestimated and that’s a sense of persona It’s a setting in the domain of the product-user relationship Let’s take a closer look
[00:25] When you open Doubao you’re greeted by a short-haired cartoon girl character It’s trying to establish a close friendly relationship And how does Qwen position itself “Can chat, gets things done” That’s the logic of a tool When the user-product relationship is different the user’s expectations and behavior are completely different In the Doubao scenario we feel like we’re talking to a person so we’re willing to invest more time and say more Even when we get an answer
[00:50] that’s not so accurate we don’t mind that much We’ll even keep joking with it which spawns a lot of shareable topics There was a true story a while back about a 78-year-old grandmother who was chatting with Doubao chatted for hours about her childhood memories And afterwards her feeling was for the first time in her life she’d been seen and heard What her own children had failed to do an AI did That’s the power of a sense of persona Two years ago when we were building a healthcare service scenario
[01:16] our AI health manager spent a ton of time on the problem of “talking like a human” We had one client we’d served for a very long time We had explicitly explained that the group contained a human doctor and an AI working together but they still believed that the AI health manager was the human doctor and kept thanking “him” In this kind of persona-bearing conversation users will volunteer richer context so the AI’s answers come out more accurate Qwen’s logic is completely different
[01:41] Opening it feels like an extension of a search engine Under that cold interface people don’t talk like humans They’ll type keywords a few tags not even a full sentence and then expect the AI to work That can never produce a good delivery The same problem applies to And then there’s Tencent’s Yuanbao Yuanbao’s call volume is actually already very large A lot of the time it’s in WeChat search and summarizing comments under WeChat Channels Although its call volume is large
[02:06] the scenarios are extremely narrow It lacks user feedback and collection of behavioral data so it can’t obtain more high-quality data to use for model training Alibaba has actually always had this kind of problem with marketing Back in June last year I complained on my WeChat Moments about Alibaba’s AQ health assistant What kind of image ‘AQ’ evokes in the public mind… I don’t need to spell it out Because of dialect issues many places can’t even pronounce the ‘Q’ sound They’ll say ‘a-qiu’, right, or ‘qiu-qiu’
[02:31] They were running massive ads all over the internet, promoting it They burned money for over half a year Then they renamed it A-Fu The day after the name change, it shot to No.3 on the Apple overall chart Just think how much money they wasted before that So you see, in the consumer-side war between the big AI players winning or losing the battle sometimes has nothing to do with product or model capability What decides whether you can keep a user is the scene and the atmosphere you create There’s been big news these past couple of days Coze has been folded wholesale into Doubao and Doubao Work has officially launched
[02:57] an AI office Agent integrated with Feishu This means ByteDance’s AI is starting to move into the enterprise market And the B-side is a different game Enterprises want delivery efficiency and certainty No boss is going to buy because Doubao’s mascot is cute In this market right now it’s Qwen Office plus DingTalk WorkBuddy plus WeCom and Doubao Work plus Feishu, the three are fighting it out And the challenges these three face are actually completely different DingTalk’s MAU is now 200 million
[03:22] Sounds terrifying, right? But if you break it down over 70% are small and medium businesses manufacturing, wholesale and retail A boss in wholesale and retail might barely even open a computer How would he ever use AI for office work? The enterprise users who can actually migrate fast to AI office work there aren’t that many on DingTalk WeCom has about 15 million users It’s mainly used to connect with consumers on WeChat So among them, consumer goods catering and services dominate Their biggest need is managing
[03:47] their thousands upon thousands of customers’ private-domain traffic and relationships WorkBuddy can connect to WeCom Now, Tencent also has an internal product called Dayuan in closed beta It does internal and external enterprise communication management and operations management Compared with Dayuan WorkBuddy is a more open a more ambitious platform It’s more in line with Tencent’s “connecting everything” core strategy Finally, let’s look at Feishu Feishu has been growing fiercely in recent years Its users are one-seventh of DingTalk’s but the revenue from its paying users is not far off from DingTalk’s
[04:13] Software, internet, and tech companies banks, new-energy carmakers MCN agencies and independent creators These people form Feishu’s base Nine out of ten AI influencers are teaching you how to connect to Feishu The impact of user self-propagation is enormous So in my view WorkBuddy and Doubao Work have a hard fight ahead But that fight isn’t in the existing market For AI office work the penetration rate is still under 5% and it’s expected to reach 80% The main battlefield for the competition
[04:38] is who can grab more of the people using AI for office work for the first time and build that dependency and habit This is a hard, hand-to-hand ground war Both sides are buying huge amounts of volume When the CPM falls below 26 or 27 they buy unlimited volume Channel build-out is pretty much being pushed with their eyes closed In that situation the efficiency of propagation becomes very important Which is why I think WorkBuddy may genuinely need to change its name Being hard to spread really does cost you dearly In the AI era, applications fighting over users is destined to be a continuous free-for-all
[05:04] Early customers have absolutely no loyalty whatsoever Whoever is easier to use, whoever is cheaper that is where they go And with AI’s help, migrating data is also very low-cost So how will the war end? We can only wait and see But what is certain is that during the war the channels and the salespeople will make an absolute killing That’s all for today See you tomorrow Bye bye